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Re´sume´ / Abstract
Since 2003, a grass-roots movement of New Rural Reconstruction (NRR) has emerged
to promote sustainable agricultural development in China. The NRR is regarded as an
alternative development model for its distinct initiative based on rural social and cul-
tural reconstruction. To provide profound understanding about its social mechanism,
we examine an original NRR case where organic farming is promoted by basketball
game. With an in-depth rural household survey, we qualitatively study this case and
derive hypothesis of social networking by basketball game. We then empirically test
this hypothesis by identifying causal social network effect on organic farming devel-
opment. Our identification stems from exploiting the endogeneity of social network
formation and provides robust micro evidence for a large social multiplier effect on
diffusion of organic farming. Also, our result highlights the role of women, education
and labor in organic farming development. Based on the result, we conclude that social
activities are cost-effective means of social networking, which is essential for diffusion
of sustainable agricultural innovation in small village.
Mots cle´s / Key words : New rural reconstruction; Social network; Organic farm-
ing; China.
Codes JEL / JEL codes : D71, O33, Q55
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1 Introduction
For many countries in development and transition, the need for sustainable agricultural
development is acknowledged as a common consensus. However, how to achieve the goal
remains questionable. In China, the critical“Three Dimensional Agrarian Problems”(San-
nong wenti) 1 make the question relevant and open to various attempts for adequate solu-
tion. In contrast to mainstream voice of industrialization and marketization of agriculture,
alternative development thinking stresses on smallholder peasants’ collective action and
cooperation for agricultural innovations (Ostrom, 2000; Berkes et al., 2002; Wen, 2007).
In practice, a grass-roots social movement of “New Rural Reconstruction (xin xiangcun
chongjian)” (Henceforth NRR) has emerged since 2003 to promote community-based and
peasant-participatory agricultural development in China.
The NRR is an ongoing rural development movement involving hundreds of thousands
of scholars, students, social activists and organizations in China. Being distinguished
from the broad campaign of “New Socialist Countryside Construction” announced by the
Chinese government2, the NRR addresses the term of “sustainability” from another per-
spective. Across the country, most NRR initiatives consist of constructing social and
cultural organization (e.g., women association and senior association) in first place, then
developing comprehensive co-operatives for the sake of economic and agricultural devel-
opment3. The practitioners of NRR advocate that social and cultural reconstruction is
the first urgency in atomized Chinese rural society. In order to achieve sustainable rural
development, one should firstly construct a solid social basis for peasants’ cooperation. To
this end, social and cultural activities are appropriate and cost-effective means to unite
peasants and to empower them the esprit of cooperation. (See more detailed discussion
about NRR in (Day, 2008; Pan and Du, 2011a))
After ten years’ development, the NRR experience begins to attract academic interests.
1It is a summary of peasants, rural society, and agriculture problems, e.g., exodus of rural labor, ageing
rural population, grabbing of arable land and deterioration of agricultural environment.
2It is supported by the rural development policy appeared in the 11th five-years development plan of
the Chinese government in 2005.
3One can refer to Lishu county co-op in Jilin, Lankao county co-op in Henan and Jiangzhuang co-op
in Shandong for example (Day, 2008).
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Some scholars have recently studied the economic aspect of NRR and regard it as the
emergence of social economy in China (Pan and Du, 2011a,b). However, the effectiveness
and efficiency of NRR have never been tested in economics and little is known about
its social mechanism. This paper thus attempts to fill this blank of literature and to
provide a more profound understanding about the NRR. Beyond the empirical test of the
relationship between social activities and sustainable agricultural innovation, the aim of
the paper is to investigate the social mechanism underlying the relationship. Our study
is essentially inspired and guided by the literature of social network economics, a thriving
literature emerged in economics to understand the influence of complex social interaction
on economic achievement (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2000; Moffitt and Valente,
2001; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2003; Lee, 2007; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al.,
2010). Our study will also make a contribution to this literature by providing micro
evidence in the domain of agricultural development.
Being lack of macro data, an in-depth case study is appropriate to derive profound
understanding about the NRR. We have thus identified an original NRR example in a vil-
lage of southern China where basketball game is put forward to unite smallholder farmers
for sustainable agricultural innovation, i.e., organic farming. With a rural household sur-
vey, we investigate farmers’ motivation for organic farming and the influence of basketball
game on their social network. This qualitative study provides a key hypothesis of social
network extension by basketball game in the village. We model the social network accord-
ing to this hypothesis and then identify the social network effect on farmers’ adoption of
organic farming using micro data collected by the survey. In terms of methodology, we
follow the discussion of Moffitt and Valente (2001) about policy intervention and identi-
fication of social network effect. Our identification stems from the exogenous change of
social network due to policy intervention (i.e., basketball game). In practice, we make use
of Heckman correction for the endogenous formation of social network, and rely on the
exclusion restriction of Inverse Mills Ratio to construct valid instruments for estimation
of endogenous social network effect. Application of this novel Heckman-IV approach can
also be found in recent studies of other domains (Zeitlin, 2009; Patnam, 2011).
For the result, we have identified a significant and robust social multiplier effect on
5
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the diffusion of organic farming which confirms the effectiveness and efficiency of NRR.
However, the social network effect seems to be negative for organic experts. Besides, we
identify women, education and labor as determinant factors for organic farming develop-
ment. Finally, our result highlights the constraints of social activity in big village and
provides guidance for rural project design in similar circumstance. Taken together, we
conclude that social network is crucial for farmers’ collective action of agricultural inno-
vation. The networking by means of social and cultural activities is thus an economic and
efficient way to promote sustainable agricultural development in small village.
For the rest of the paper: Section 2 presents the case of NRR; Section 3 provides details
of our fieldwork; Section 4 describes the dataset; Section 5 explains the methodological and
econometric issues; Section 6 discusses the main results and policy implications; Section
7 concludes.
2 An example of New Rural Reconstruction
In China, the Rural Reconstruction (RR) movement can be traced back to the 1920’s-30’s
(Pan and Du, 2011a). A new wave of RR in contemporary China grew out of a shift
of debate on “Three Dimensional Agrarian Problems” from the promotion of market-led
agricultural economy to the focus on peasantry. The advocates of NRR argue that given
the large population and atomized structure of Chinese rural society, the agrarian problems
cannot be solved if they are simply treated as one agricultural economic issue in free market
economy. The real solution relies on the peasantry side other than the market side, i.e.,
one should rely on peasants’ cooperation for economic, social and agricultural innovation
to achieve sustainable rural development (Wen, 2007). This new thinking was rapidly
developed and attracted social activists and students to translate it into action. Since
2003, students and social activists are trained at “Liangshuming center” and “James yen
institute” to implement NRR experiments (e.g., Comprehensive Co-operatives, Peasant
Participatory Agroecology and Community Supported Agriculture) in poor villages across
the country (Day, 2008).
Among others, we are interested in an original example in southern China. Sancha
6
Etudes et Documents n◦06, CERDI, 2013
village (109.01E/22.73N) is a small village ( i.e., 120 permanent households) under the
administration of Pingma town4 in Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region5. With an annual
revenue of about 1700 yuan/habitant, the village is classified as a provincial “Poor Village”
in Guangxi. Traditionally, the social life and agricultural production in the village are
organized on basis of four families (i.e., families Xu, Li, Huang and Lu, also labeled
as production groups 1, 2, 3 and 4). Since 1980’s, the implementation of Household
Responsibility System (HRS) has broken the collective system into individual production
(Lin, 1997).
Given its underdevelopment state and well preserved agricultural environment, Sancha
village was targeted by an NGO, called PCD6, as a NRR experimental site for sustainable
agricultural development in 2005. Initially, a project of organic paddy rice production
was introduced to family Li of the village for experimentation. During this early stage,
PCD, in collaboration with Guangxi Maize Research Institute (GMRI)7, had provided en-
vironmental education, technical guidance and marketing support (Community Supported
Agriculture) to encourage farmers’ conversion from conventional farming to organic farm-
ing. After three years’ experimentation, diverse organic technologies (e.g., substitution of
chemical fertilizers by organic compost, rice-duck integrated system and insect control by
medicinal plants) were successfully adapted to local condition and judged as successful.
The adoption rate had reached 90% within family Li in 2008.
The project’s ambition was beyond one family. PCD aimed to promote successful
organic farming to the whole village and influence nearby villages. Nevertheless, it was
not a simple task. According to PCD’s investigation, farmers of other families doubted
the yield of organic farming due to lack of information. With few resource, the effect
of environmental education seemed limited to convince new farmers. After one year’s
promotion, the adoption rate was only 29% for the whole village in 2008.
4There are five levels of administration in China from high to low: province, city, county, town and
village. Governments present at each level except for the village level.
5Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region is a “Zhuang” minority dominated region where the economic
development is low at the national level. See map9.1 in appendix for the location of Sancha village.
6PCD (Partnerships for Community Development) is a NGO based in Hong Kong. More information
about this NGO can be found on their site: http://www.pcd.org.hk/eng/index.html.
7GMRI is an agronomic research institute sponsored by local government.
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Fortunately, the situation was changed by policy intervention of local government. For
sake of urban-rural integration, local government decided to incorporate Sancha village
into the Pingma community8. As a result, Sancha village received a government grant
for its community building. With the grant, an old elementary school playground were
renovated and transformed to a floodlit basketball court at the end of 2008.
For most farmers, the new court represents modernity and evokes a basketball en-
thusiasm. By realizing this basketball mode, the village committee decided to organize
basketball game regularly with support from PCD. Particularly, a basketball league match
was organized by inviting neighbor village teams to play on the new court. For pragmatic
consideration, the basketball game was generally programmed in the evening. Because
farmers would have more spare time in the evening so that more audience could present.
Moreover, the need of children in school was considered as well. However, the mountain-
ous environment condition and lack of road light might constrain some farmers to join the
game in the evening9. According to the committee, thanks to the basketball league, the
social life in Sancha village was substantially enriched. More importantly, the barrier of
four families was broken down and more intensified social interactions encouraged farm-
ers’ cohesion. For instance, in 2009, the village had won the league match against seven
neighbor villages. The prize of a black pig was equally shared by four families.
At the end of story, PCD found that the project of organic farming also moved forward
along with the basketball game. Farmers’ knowledge about organic technologies increased
considerably. At the end of 2009, the adoption rate reported by farmers reached 71% for
the whole village. To confirm this story and explore the social mechanism of basketball
game in promotion of organic farming, we decide to investigate more closely in the village.
8The term of community is employed to conform the rural village with urban district in the rural
community construction movement (See reports of Ministry of Civil Affairs for more details).
9This particular condition is important for our identification strategy, we will discuss it in details in
the section of methodology.
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3 The survey and research intuition
The aim of our fieldwork is to investigate: 1) the motivation of smallholder farmers to
adopt organic farming; 2) the role of basketball game in the promotion of organic farming;
3) the evolution of social networks in the village. A semi-structured questionnaire is
designed according to information gathered via internet and by telephone interview with
project field coordinator. To make our questionnaire relevant to the context and gather
more background information, we begin with a preliminary interview with key informants
(i.e., head of village and party secretary) as well as a sample of 15 households randomly
selected in the village (i.e., 10 organic farmers and 5 non-organic farmers, which represent
about 10% of the population).
All interviews take place at farmer’ home at dinner so that the conversation is un-
rolled in a friendly atmosphere. According to these interviews, three main motivations
for organic farming are identified: 1) health consideration 2) economic profit and 3) in-
formation. Firstly, the health consideration is put forward by most farmers who practice
organic farming (9 of 10 respondents). Six of them confirm that the syndromes due to
chemical pesticide spray are general and significant, which push them to adopt organic
farming. Secondly, the price premium of organic rice is attractive for poor farmers (7
of 10 respondents). Although organic food is still a niche market in China, the organic
price is about two times the conventional price10. Thirdly, the knowledge of organic farm-
ing is strongly correlated with farmers’ adoption. For instance, organic experts of family
Li, who have engaged in PCD’s experimentation, have comprehensive information about
organic farming and are familiar with all organic technologies. They are thus confident
about the productivity of organic farming and support it firmly. For new organic farmers,
most regard organic farming as agriculture without chemical fertilizer and pesticide. But
their understandings about comprehensive organic technologies are fuzzy. For non-organic
farmers, they have heard about organic farming but with no comprehensive knowledge.
Most of them are worried about yield reduction due to conversion.
We then investigate the source of information about organic farming by asking the
10The price of organic rice is 7 yuan/kg through the CSA marketing, whereas the price for conventional
rice is only 4 yuan/kg on local market.
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question “where do you learn organic farming?” For farmers of family Li, all of them
mention PCD as information provider. However, this is not the case for farmers from
other families. Five of them report that they learn organic farming from their relatives,
neighbors and friends. The answers is confirmed by the coordinator of PCD, stating that
they have tried to promote organic farming to all farmers, but many of them are out
of reach given the limited human resource. Curiously, three farmers mention that they
learn about organic farming on the occasion of basketball game. As one reports: “I get
to understand organic farming for the first time after the conversation with LB11 in the
basketball game.”
We get the hint and continue to explore the role of basketball game. According to
our filed observation, most farmers of family Li live close to the basketball court. In fact,
given their proximity, farmers of family Li get used to play basketball game and love this
sport. Therefore, participation in the basketball game will certainly induce more contacts
with farmers of family Li. This observation explains why farmers get information about
organic farming from the basketball court.
“So what is the biggest change with basketball game?” To this question, we get different
answers. In general, 13 of 15 respondents confirm that basketball game has induced more
communication with other farmers. Not surprisingly, when asked to count the friends of
other family, farmers who report to frequently participate in the game generally count more
than 15 names. In contrast, those who report to participate rarely count less than 5 names.
Intuitively, our interview reveals that farmers’ social networks are indeed intensified due
to the basketball game. This understanding leads to a hypothesis for empirical test: the
basketball game promotes organic farming in Sancha village through the mechanism of
social networking.
To test this hypothesis, we revise our questionnaire with the feedback from the inter-
views and use it for collection of data from all households in Sancha village. In practice,
the formal survey is implemented in form of face-to-face interview with household head
at home. The formal survey lasts for about one hour. Key questions of “On average, have
you or your family participated in the basketball game as player or audience more than
11LB is a farmer of family Li.
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3 times per month?12” is asked to measure farmers’ participation in the basketball game,
“Do you practice organic farming on at least one plot of your paddy land?” and ‘“Can
you tell the difference between organic farming and conventional farming? 13” are asked to
measure farmers’ organic adoption. Besides, a number of household’s socio-economic char-
acteristics (e.g., age, gender and education level) and living condition are also recorded
during our home visiting. Respondents are asked to recall information for 2007, 2008 and
2009. It should note that the data we collected is a retrospective panel data using a single
survey. To ensure the accuracy, we check the answers with available records provided by
the village head14 and drop information from any non-relevant interview15. After the data
cleaning, information of 108 households for 2008 and 2009 are retained for the empirical
analysis. The response rate of our survey is 90%16.
4 Data
In this section, we describe the dataset derived from the formal survey and used for
our empirical analysis. It contains information about farmers’ report of participation in
the basketball game and organic farming adoption as well as a number of socio-economic
characteristics for 108 households during 2008 and 200917. Table 1 presents the descriptive
statistics of mains variables by organic status of household. A summary for the definitions
of these variables can be found in the appendix 9.2.
12According to village head, the game is organized weekly. So we regard households who report to
participate at least three times per month as frequent participants that are able to make effective social
connection with others.
13The definition of organic farming follows that of International Federation of Organic Agriculture
Movements.
14Especially for the adoption of organic farming.
15The rejected cases include farmers who were too old to answer the question, farmers who refused to
be interviewed and farmers who don’t practice agricultural production.
16The response rate is reported according to the definition and calculation of the American Association
for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR, 2011)
17All interviewed households have actively participated in paddy rice production, using conventional
or organic methods. Some in a hybrid way, which means both conventional and organic farming.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by organic adoption status
Total (216) Organic Adopter (108) Non-Adopter (108) t-test
mean Sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Individual characteristics:
BASKET(1=Participated) 0.55 (0.50) 0.94 (0.25) 0.17 (0.37) 0.00
AGE(in years) 53.62 (12.82) 54.00 (12.19) 53.24 (13.46) 0.66
SEX(1=woman) 0.61 (0.49) 0.67 (0.47) 0.56 (0.50) 0.09
EDUCATION(in years) 3.63 (3.31) 3.8 (3.52) 3.46 (3.10) 0.46
HOUSEHOLDSIZE(in no.) 3.42 (1.61) 3.49 (1.67) 3.34 (1.56) 0.50
FARMSIZE(in mu) 2.13 (0.95) 2.22 (0.96) 2.05 (0.93) 0.18
INCOME(in Yuan) 1946.00 (5919.65) 2331.02 (7067.62) 1560.97 (4490.14) 0.34
REMOTENESS(walk time) 1.86 (0.70) 1.56 (0.65) 2.16 (0.63) 0.00
KID(in no.) 0.34 (0.61) 0.35 (0.60) 0.32 (0.62) 0.74
Peers’ characteristics:
GORGANIC 0.54 (0.34) 0.79 (0.10) 0.28 (0.30) 0.00
GAGE 53.75 (1.13) 54.18 (0.59) 53.31 (1.34) 0.00
GSEX 0.61 (0.05) 0.63 (0.02) 0.59 (0.06) 0.00
GEDUCATION 3.56 (0.49) 3.57 (0.18) 3.55 (0.67) 0.82
GHOUSEHOLDSIZE 3.45 (0.25) 3.40 (0.14) 3.50 (0.31) 0.00
GFARMSIZE 2.14 (0.08) 2.10 (0.06) 2.18 (0.08) 0.00
GINCOME 2035.24 (879.85) 2109.30 (669.60) 1961.17 (1046.92) 0.22
Note: For all tests of means, the null hypothesis is that the means are equal against a two-sided
alternative. The confidence level is at 5%.
Table1 provides a brief picture of Sancha village. As one can note, the arable land
resource is scarce in the village, the average area of paddy field is only 2.13 mu (0.14 ha)
per household. The labor force seems abundant (3.4 persons per household), but most of
which are aged people (54 years old) and female farmer (61%). Their average education
level is hardly four years of primary school. This is not surprising in rural China. Along
with the development of manufacturing sector, more and more rural household rely their
livelihood on off-farm activities. Since there is few off-farm employment in the countryside
(e.g., in Sancha village, the average annual off-farm income is only 1946 yuan (311 US
dollar)), rural households intend to migrate and work in the city to improve their life.
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However, under the Hukou system and rigid land tenure regime, rural household with
Rural Hukou can not sell their land and easily integrate in the city18. Consequently,
man work in the city and woman work at home is the best strategy for most poor rural
households. As reported by Cai and Wang (2008), more than 150 million Chinese farmers
worked out in the city in 2011.
When we compare the organic adopters with non-adopters in Sancha village, some
preliminary evidences should be noted. Firstly, there is significant difference in terms of
basketball game participation. 94% organic adopter have reported to frequently partici-
pate in the basketball game in comparison to 17% non-adopter. Secondly, the difference
in peers’ adoption rate is also significant. For adopters, 83% of their peers also adopt.
While for non-adopters, only 28% of their peers adopt. Thirdly, most peers’ characteris-
tics are also significantly different, e.g., adopters have more aged and female peers with
large household size and big farm land. To sort out all these correlations and determine
the role of each, we need turn to a more rigorous empirical analysis.
5 Methodological framework
5.1 Literature review
In this section, we firstly make a brief literature review to guide our empirical analysis. The
social network effect (also known as peers effect) is often studied in diffusion of innovation
in economics (Young, 2000; Rogers, 1995). Specifically in the domain of agricultural
economics, the social network has attracted keen interests to explain the diffusion of
agricultural technologies in developing countries (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996; Conley
and Udry, 2001; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Munshi, 2004; Miguel and Kremer, 2003). In
spite of its solid theoretic foundation, the empirical estimation of social network effect is
not easy. In summary, one needs to address three fundamental problems when estimating
18In China, the population is administrated by Urban Hukou and Rural Hukou according to the per-
manent residence. In accordance, the schemes of social security and medical care are distinct for two
types of Hukou. People with Rural Hukou are thus not covered by the urban social safety nets even they
work in the city. For compensation, they have the use right of arable land for agricultural exploitation
but without property right, i.e., they can not sell the land under their exploitation.
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social network effect. The first one is discussed by Manski (1993) and commonly known as
the “reflection problem”. Basically, it refers to the difficulty to disentangle the endogenous
social network effect from the exogenous contextual effect when using a “linear-in-means”
model to estimate social network effect19. It could be regarded as a simultaneity problem
in econometrics. The second is the endogenous formation of social network. For instance,
in our case, farmer’s participation in the basketball game and his adoption of organic
farming could be jointly determined by his intrinsic attributes (e.g., sociability and health
state) which are non-observable to econometrician. The formation of basketball network
is thus endogenous. Third, the effect of social network could be spuriously estimated if
some correlated environmental effects are omitted by econometrician. In our case, the
socio-economic endowments may be family specific (e.g., culture and expertise). These
endowments may probably confound with the social network effect.
To overcome these problems and achieve consistent estimation of social network effect,
varied methods have been proposed. For instance, one could rely on the nonlinearity
between individual and group response which is imposed by a discrete choice model as
discussed by Brock and Durlauf (2000). One could also explore the exogenous variation
in group size to achieve the identification (Lee, 2007; Boucher et al., 2012). Moreover, the
overlapping structure of social networks could be explored to derive spatial instruments for
the identification of social network effect (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009). Finally, as discussed by
Moffitt and Valente (2001), the change of social network by policy intervention could be an
exogenous source of identification. In our case, the policy intervention of basketball game
is destined to all farmers in the village, whereas some are hindered by their remote location
(given the evening condition of basketball game) and family situation(kids). Therefore,
the specificity of basketball game provides a possibility of identification. We will discuss
more in details about our identification strategy in the section of econometric issues.
Before that, we firstly turn to the definition of social network in our study.
19In the linear-in-means model, the outcome of each individual depends linearly on his own character-
istics, on the mean outcome of his reference group and on its mean characteristics.
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5.2 Model the social network in Sancha village
In literature, egocentric data is usually collected to measure specific social networks, e.g.,
kinship network and friendship network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In this study, we
aim to explore the social interactions in a broader scope, i.e., social activity. In the case of
basketball game, it is difficult to distinguish all kinds of interactions. For instance, one may
interact with more people besides his family members and close friends, or get information
just from conversations between others. To this effect, we decide to take account of all
potential social links to define the social network. One may argue that it is unrealistic for
a farmer to interact with all peers in the group. It is indeed true. However, the risk of
precise measurement of social links is the potential measurement errors and information
omission. Alternatively, if one can justify the efficiency of an extensive network involving
all participants, it is convincing to infer the efficiency of more intensive social network.
Therefore, we adopt here the loose definition of social network for the identification of
social network effect.
Following previous discussions, the social network of Sancha village is composed of two
parts, i.e., family network and basketball game extension. First of all, to represent the
family network in a matrix way, we construct a matrix F = [f1if2if3if4i] where the row
i represent the household i, the columns f1 − f4 represent four family dummies. This
can be transformed to a symmetric matrix W1 that represents family specific social links
between household i and household j within the village.
W1 = [w1ij] = F × F ′ (1)
Next, participation in the basketball game is assumed to extend family network W1.
Similarly, the extension induced by participation in basketball game can be represented
by a one column matrix C = [ci] where ci is a dummy variable measuring household i’s
participation in the game. It can also be transformed into a symmetric matrix W2:
W2 = [w2ij] = C × C ′ (2)
15
Etudes et Documents n◦06, CERDI, 2013
By combining W1 and W2, we construct a symmetric matrix G to represent the
extended social network taking account both family relationship and basketball game:
G ≡ W1 +W2 (3)
With this definition, we implicitly suppose that the social interactions within network
W1 and W2 are of the same effect. Regardless of any particular nature, e.g., family or
friend, the social network effect that we are going to identify is the mean effect within the
social network G. By convention, one is NOT considered as peer of himself. The matrix
G is then normalized for subsequent use. With this modeling, we can visualize the social
network G in Figure 1.
Figure 1 is produced with NodeXL using data collected by our survey. The nodes of
different forms (i.e., dark triangle, red point, yellow diamond and blue circle) correspond to
households of four families (i.e., Xu, Li, Huang and Lu) respectively. The edges represent
the social links between households according to our definition of social network (i.e., both
16
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in the same family or in the basketball game). To make it more intuitive, households who
participate in the basketball game are placed in the center of the graph. One can note
that in 2008 (i.e., before the renovation of court), a few households (majorally of family
Li) participate in the game and the social network is relatively sparse. While in 2009,
more households are attracted by the game and thus intensified the social network. This
change of social network could be explored for the identification of social network effect.
5.3 Econometric issues
5.3.1 Baseline study
As a benchmark of our empirical analysis, we would firstly conduct a baseline study to
test the relevance of basketball game on organic farming adoption using a simple model
as follows:
ORGANICi,t = α0 + α1BASKETi,t + α2Xi,t + Fs + Tt + εi,t (4)
Here the dependent variable ORGANICi,t is household i’s organic farming adoption,
BASKETi,t is household i’s participation in basketball game at time t, Xi,t control for
a number of household socio-economic endowments such as age, gender, education level,
household size, farm size and off-farm income. These endowments are expected to capture
the human capital and physical capital of household. Fs are family dummies to control for
unobservable family specific characteristics. Tt denotes a year dummy to capture common
shocks related to the year.
With this specification, BASKETi,t could be endogenous due to unobservable char-
acteristics of farmer (e.g., health state and sociability). To address this problem, an IV
estimation is applied. Two instruments are available in our specific setting: the remote-
ness from the basketball court and the number of kids of household. As discussed earlier,
the mountainous environment and the evening condition make household’s participation
in the basketball sensible to a small geographical distance (i.e., 5 to 15 minutes walk at
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means). Nevertheless, such small distance seems less possible to determine important
agricultural decision such as organic farming adoption. To make sure, this exclusion re-
striction will be checked by Sargan over-identification test. This baseline regression is
useful to confirm our intuition of research on one hand. On the other hand, it serve to
check the validity of our instruments for identification purpose.
5.3.2 Identification of social network effect
Next, we would like to identify the social network effect to validate the mechanism under-
lying the relationship. To do so, we estimate a model that describe the interdependent
relationship between individual adoption decision and his peers’ adoption decision within
the predefined social network (Case, 1992; Manski, 1993; Durlauf and Young, 2001; Moffitt
and Valente, 2001).








+ β2Xi,t + τt + i,t, (5)
In the model, household i’s organic adoption depends on the mean adoption rate of
his peers in his group Pi. This social network effect is captured by coefficient β1. In
the connotation of Manski (1993) we call it the endogenous social effect. Meanwhile,
household i’s decision also depends on the characteristics of his peers, which represent the
contextual effect and is captured by β2. Also, a number of socio-economic endowments of
household are controlled for by X. Finally, τt is a year dummy to capture the year shock
and the error term i,t is i.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and an unknown variance
associated with i.
We then write the structural model in matrix notation:
ORGANICi,t = β0 + β1GORGANICi,t + β2GXi,t + β3Xi,t + τt + i,t (6)
where G is the social network matrix as predefined earlier. Gij = 1/ni if i and j
share the same family or both participate in the basketball game, and 0 otherwise. The
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objective of our identification is to disentangle the endogenous social effect (i.e, social
network effect) from contextual effect and possible correlated effects in the error. We will
address the problems as discussed in the literature one by one.
First of all, to rule out the correlated effects specific to family, we compare household’s
organic adoption within each family by adding family dummies ςs s ∈ 1...4 in equation 6.
The second concern is the endogenous formation of social network. As discussed earlier,
it is possible that household will self-select into the basketball game due to unobservable
characteristics (e.g., health state and sociability). To address this concern, we will make
use of Heckman correction for the self-selection problem (Heckman, 1979). For a demon-
stration, we model the adoption processus and participation processus with two separate
equations:
ORGANICi,t = β0 + β1GORGANICi,t + β2GXi,t + β3Xi,t + ςs + τt + µi,t + i,t (7)
PR(BASKETi,t = 1) = δ0 + δ1GXi,t + δ2Xi,t + δ3Zi,t + ςs + τt + ξi,t (8)
The presence of unobservable characteristics in both µi,t and ξi,t is the origin of self-
selection problem. Using two exogenous variables Zi,t (i.e.,remoteness and number of
kids) and making strict assumption (i.e., µi,t and ξi,t are mean zero, jointly and normally
distributed with the variance-covariance matrix), the expectation of µi,t conditional on
participation can be calculated using the formula below:
E[µi,t|BASKETi,t = 1] = ισµλi,t (9)
Of which, λi,t is the Inverse Mills Ratio calculated from the residues predicted from
the participation equation 8.
λ(ξi,t) = φ(ξi,t)/Φ(ξi,t) (10)
Therefore, to get rid of self-selection problem, one can calculate λi,t and explicitly
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control for it in the adoption equation as follows:
ORGANICi,t = β0 + β1GORGANICi,t + β2GXi,t + β3Xi,t + β4λi,t + ςs + τt + i,t (11)
The third is the reflection problem. One of the solutions proposed in literature is to find
appropriate instruments for GORGANICi,t (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009; Moffitt and Valente,
2001). Here, the key observation we make is that Gλi,t and G
2λi,t are two candidates under
two conditions: 1) λi,t is significant 2) Gλi,t and G
2λi,t are excludable from equation11.
The first condition relies on the assumption of endogenous formation of social network.
The second condition of exclusion restriction is ensured by the assumption that farmer’s
participation in the basketball game should not be driven by his strategic behavior based
on his observation of peers’ organic adoption. This crucial assumption is strong but
seems hold given the timing of our survey (i.e., one year around the court renovation).
During such a short period, any strategic behaviour is unlikely which is based on complete
observation of the entire social network.
To ensure the exclusion restriction, we also need control for both observable and non-
observable characteristics (i.e., λi,t) of household in the adoption equation 11. As suggested
by other studies (Arcand and Fafchamps, 2011; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Conley and
Topa, 2002), the assortative matching is common in social network formation, i.e., farmers’
characteristics are similar within their group. It means Gλi,t and G
2λi,t may correlate with
λi,t in the model.
In summary, under the reasonable assumption of exclusion restriction, our identifica-
tion of social network effect is achieved in three steps:
1. The participation equation 8 is estimated with two Zi,t (i.e., remoteness from the
court and number of kids) to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio λi,t (Maddala, 1983).
2. The assumption of endogenous formation of social network (i.e., λi,t 6= 0) is checked.
If it holds, we construct two instruments Gλi,t and G
2λi,t for subsequent use.
3. The adoption equation 11 is estimated by applying the IV estimation using Gλi,t
and G2λi,t as instruments for GORGANICi,t.
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6 Result and discussion
6.1 Basketball game and organic farming
As a starting point, we firstly regress our baseline model to test the relationship between
farmers’ participation in basketball game and their organic farming adoption. The result is
reported in table 3, which serves as a benchmark result and a check of our two instruments.
Table 3: Results of baseline regression
Dependant Variable: ORGANIC(1/0)
Estimator PROBIT XTPROBIT IV-PROBIT
BASKET 0.28*** (0.00) 0.28*** (0.00) 0.26*** (0.00)
AGE 1.98e-03 (0.13) 1.96e-03 (0.14) 2.15e-03 (0.15)
SEX 0.12*** (0.00) 0.12*** (0.00) 0.13*** (0.00)
EDUCATION 0.01** (0.02) 0.01** (0.02) 0.01** (0.03)
HOUSEHOLDSIZE 0.01 (0.26) 0.01 (0.26) 0.01 (0.29)
FARMSIZE 0.09*** (0.00) 0.09*** (0.00) 0.09*** (0.00)
INCOME 1.42e-07 (0.95) 1.96e-07 (0.93) 1.76e-07 (0.95)
FAMILY2 0.30*** (0.00) 0.30*** (0.00) 0.34*** (0.00)
FAMILY3 -0.04 (0.43) -0.04 (0.46) -0.04 (0.44)
FAMILY4 0.07 (0.12) 0.07 (0.15) 0.07 (0.12)
YEAR 0.19*** (0.00) 0.19*** (0.00) 0.21*** (0.00)
Observations 216 216 216
Log pseudolikelihood -39.79 -124.46
P-value Wald chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sargan test 0.98
Notes: Average Marginal Effects are calculated for the coefficient and robust p-value reported
in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
respectively. P-value of Wald chi2 is presented. P-value of Sargan test is presented for the
IV-probit estimator. First stage result is presented in Appendix 3.
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For the sake of comparison, we employ different estimators (i.e., probit and xtprobit)
and yield consistent result. The result indicates, all else equal, farmer’s participation in
the basketball game will increase his probability to adopt organic farming by 28%. The
effect of basketball game is positive and significant, which confirms the effectiveness and
efficiency of social activity for farmers’ agricultural innovation. To address the concern
of endogeneity problem of participation, we apply an IV estimation using household’s
remoteness from the court and the numbers of kids as instruments. One can note that
the statistics of Sargan test doesn’t reject the validity of our instruments, and the effect
of basketball game remains significant with a magnitude of 0.26.
Regarding other determinants of organic farming, the result highlights the role of
women and education. It is plausible that female and more educated farmers are more
sensible to the health issue. Since the health concerns is the first motivation for organic
farming as revealed by our fieldwork, the result just confirms this motivation. This result
is in line with other studies which also find education indispensable in promotion of new
technology (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996; Huffman, 2001). Farm size is found a positive
effect for organic adoption. A conceivable explanation is that organic farming is associated
with high risk (i.e., yield lost) as other new technologies. Household with big farm could
alleviate the risk by allocating a small portion of its farm for experimentation. Finally,
family Li (FAMILY2) is significantly related to organic farming. The result confirms the
finding of our fieldwork that household of family Li has accumulated rich experience of
organic farming during the early stage of experimentation. Their expertise sustains their
choice of organic farming.
6.2 Diffusion of organic farming through social network
The literature and our fieldwork provide a mechanism to explain the relationship between
basketball game and organic farming, i.e., the social network effect. We thus attempt to
identify the social network effect as discussed earlier. The identification result is presented
in table 4, we will follow the three-steps identification for a discussion.
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Table 4: Participation and social network effect
Naive Step1 Step2 Step3
Dependant Var ORGANIC BASKET ORGANIC ORGANIC
Estimator OLS PROBIT OLS IV
GORGANIC 1.31*** (0.00) 0.35 (0.17) 0.67** (0.01)
AGE 3.20e-03 (0.41) 0.01*** (0.00) 3.36e-03 (0.31) 3.66e-03 (0.34)
SEX 0.15 (0.11) 0.06 (0.29) 0.19*** (0.01) 0.15** (0.01)
EDUCATION 0.02** (0.03) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00)
FARMSIZE 0.09*** (0.00) -0.04* (0.08) 0.03 (0.26) 0.05* (0.08)
INCOME -3.65e-06 (0.49) 1.98e-06 (0.81) -8.99e-06* (0.07) -8.53e-06 (0.17)
HOUSEHOLDSIZE 0.03 (0.15) 0.05** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.00) 0.07*** (0.00)
GAGE 0.07 (0.54) 0.43*** (0.00) 0.10 (0.35) 0.11 (0.33)
GSEX 1.03 (0.68) 3.42* (0.05) 4.59** (0.02) 2.97 (0.14)
GEDUCATION 0.23** (0.03) 0.82*** (0.00) 0.86*** (0.00) 0.71*** (0.00)
GFARMSIZE 0.17 (0.84) -1.87*** (0.00) -1.79** (0.04) -0.99 (0.28)





GHOUSEHOLDSIZE 0.93 (0.18) 1.61** (0.04) 2.76*** (0.00) 2.43*** (0.00)
REMOTENESS -0.14*** (0.00)
KID 0.05* (0.09)
IMR 0.28*** (0.00) 0.26*** (0.00)
Observations 216 216 216 216
R2/Log likelihood 0.64 -51.07 0.73 0.73
F -test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sargan test 0.71
Notes: Average Marginal Effects are calculated for probit estimation in col2; Robust p-value is represented
in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. R2
value is reported for OLS and IV estimation, log pseudolikelihood value is reported for probit estimation.
The p-value of Sargan test is reported for IV estimation. The family and year dummies are controlled
except for naive estimation in col1.
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6.2.1 Social activity and its constraints
In the first column of table 4, we present the result of a “naive” estimation of social
network effect. One can note that the coefficient of social network effect is significant
and quite large (i.e., 1.31), which seems too good to be true. On the other hand, most
contextual effects are non-significant. It raises doubts about the spurious identification of
social network effect as discussed by Manski (1993). We will compare this result with our
three-steps identification result and find that the “naive” result is indeed not robust.
In first step, column two reports the estimation result of the participation equation
8 using a probit estimator. The result is instructive to understand the advantages and
constraints of social activity in rural areas and guide other fieldwork. Firstly, we find that
education and household size are positively correlated with household’s participation in
the basketball game. Besides, senior people are also more interested by the basketball
game. It is not surprising since senior people have generally more spare time and less
life pressure. This result is in line with Putnam (2001)’s finding of cohort effect where
senior people belong to more organizations than younger people. In rural China, the role
of senior people is recognized to guide other NRR project. For instance, Wang and Hale
(2009) report that a number of successful NRR cooperatives are founded on basis of senior
association.
On the other hand, farm size is found to impede household’s participation. In our
analysis, the farm size may capture the activity of agricultural production. Big farm
probably implicates more agricultural work and less spare time. This result suggests a
potential constraint of social activity in big villages, which is supported by Wang and Hale
(2009)’s finding stating that NRR has encountered more difficulties in big villages. The
feasibility of social activity remains thus questionable in big villages where agricultural
burden is heavy. Moreover, we find the remoteness from the court significantly hinders
household’s participation in the basketball game. It also questions the efficiency of social
activity in big villages where households are sparsely located.
For peers’ influence, the signs and significance are similar with one’s own charac-
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teristics. For instance, more senior, educated, female and big household peers will en-
courage one’s participation, while peers’ farm size play the opposite effect. The result
suggests an assortative matching in the formation of social network in our case (Arcand
and Fafchamps, 2011; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Conley and Topa, 2002). Consequently,
the problem of endogenous formation of social network should be taken into account in
our following analysis.
6.2.2 Effect of social network on organic farming development
We continue with the identification of social network effect. In column three, the Inverse
Mills Ratio (λ) of Heckman is calculated and controlled in the model. One can note
that the coefficient of IMR is significant, which suggests the presence of self-selection
problem. A likelihood ratio test is thus performed. The rejection of null hypothesis has
confirmed this assumption and supports the necessity of Heckman correction. Moreover,
the significant IMR enables us to construct instruments Gλi,t and G
2λi,t for subsequent
identification use.
In column four, we address the reflection problem by applying the IV estimation.
The model we estimate is a Linear Probit Model (LPM), which is simple and intuitive for
estimation and interpretation. Another advantage of the LPM model is the comprehensive
statistical tests that enable us to check assumptions such as exclusion restriction of our
instruments. Finally, given the survey nature of our data, it is possible that the errors
of respondents are correlated. To eliminate this concern, a bootstrap approach is applied
to the estimation. For the result, we firstly note that the magnitude of social network
effect is reduced by 50% comparing to the naive estimation. However, it remains positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level. The result indicates that, all else equal,
10% growth in the fraction of peers who adopt organic farming will increase 6.7% of the
probability that a household also adopt organic farming. This is a large social multiplier
effect in comparison with other studies in the literature (Conley and Udry, 2001; Bandiera
and Rasul, 2006). With this result, we can explain the social mechanism of basketball
game by a strong social network effect. This understanding is crucial for government or
development agency with aim to promote sustainable agriculture innovation in poor rural
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area. Apart from conventional promotion such as advertising campaign and subsidy, they
could also rely on the social network effect for technology diffusion. To do so, social or
cultural activities are cost-effective means for networking as suggested by our result.
For the contextual effects, we identify more significant coefficients comparing to the
naive estimation. These contextual effects provide a more comprehensive understanding
of the social network effect. For instance, peers’ education level and household size signif-
icantly influence household’s adoption decision whereas peers’ off-farm income plays the
opposite role. Given the knowledge and labor intensity of organic farming, one plausible
explanation is that farmers share knowledge as well as labor within their social network.
In contrary, peers’ off-farm income may capture off-farm employment opportunity pro-
vided by peers. These opportunities will certainly raise a competition of labor for organic
farming thus discourage the adoption.
Finally, apart from the social network effect, the effects of household’s characteris-
tics are meaningful and useful to understand the advantages and constraints for organic
farming development in rural China. We note here women, education and labor as three
key factors to promote organic farming. As explained earlier, the Chinese rural society is
characterized by a massive exodus of male rural labor. This phenomenon represent both
constraints and opportunity for organic farming development. On one hand, government
should recognize the critical role of women in rural society and rely on them for a change to
sustainable agriculture. On the other hand, more educational service (i.e., environmental
education and technical formation) is needed to reinforce farmers’ capacity for sustainable
development.
6.3 Robustness check
For the robustness check, we firstly explore the panel structure of our data to estimate a
within model which relies on the variation of social network due to policy intervention (i.e.,
renovation of basket court and organization of basketball league match). The advantage
of within model is to get rid of any time-invariant correlated effects. To address the
concerns of time-variant factors, we control for the IMR of Heckman under the assumption
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of exclusion restriction. Also, we can combine the advantages of within model and the
IV approach to run an Within-2SLS estimation. These exercises are useful to serve as a
comparison with previous Heckman-IV approach.
Secondly, as discussed by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), we can take advantage of the over-
lapping structure of social network for the identification of social network effect. In prac-
tice, one could construct spatial instruments G2X which consist of characteristics of peer’s
peers to identify the social network effect. In our case, the basketball game turns the social
network overlap among four families (see figure 1 in section 5). This network structure
makes it possible to apply the estimator of Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) (BDF henceforth). For
concerns of endogenous formation of social network (i.e., farmers’ self-selection into the
basketball game) and correlated effects, we will control for IMR in the model and estimate
a within model.
Finally, the social network effect may be heterogeneous. The intuition is that if the
social network effect is due to information spillover, farmers who have precise information
about organic farming should be less sensible to the social network effect. In presence of
heterogeneous expertise, social network effect is expected to be non significant for organic
experts of family Li. It could even be negative if the social network becomes too large
(see explanation of Bandiera and Rasul (2006)). To check this hypothesis, we conduct a
difference-in-difference type analysis based on the timing of organic adoption. We note
here new adopters and organic experts have the same incentive for organic farming, they
are comparable to determine the heterogenous social network effect. In practice, we
construct a dummy variable C which indicates “0” for organic experts (i.e., households
who participated in experimentation of PCD) and “1” for new adopters(i.e., households
who adopt organic farming since 2009). The dummy is then crossed with the variable
GORGANIC to construct a new variable C ∗ GORGANIC and included in the model.
Finally the estimation is made by within and within-2SLS estimators for comparison.
Intuitively, we expect significant and positive sign for C ∗ GORGANIC, whereas the
GORGANIC could be nonsignificant or negative.
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Table 5: Robustness check(I)
Dependant variable: ORGANIC(1/0)
Estimator WITHIN WITHIN-2SLS BDF BDF-WITHIN
GORGANIC 0.60** (0.04) 0.76*** (0.01) 0.60*** (0.01) 0.79*** (0.00)
AGE 0.65** (0.01) 0.56** (0.01) 3.60e-03 (0.26) 0.54** (0.02)
SEX 0.16** (0.01)
EDUCATION 0.02*** (0.00)
FARMSIZE -0.03 (0.53) -0.02 (0.73) 0.05* (0.06) -0.01 (0.76)
INCOME 6.67e-06 (0.44) 6.78e-06 (0.42) -8.62e-06* (0.07) 6.81e-06 (0.42)
HOUSEHOLDSIZE 0.09 (0.17) 0.10 (0.13) 0.07*** (0.00) 0.10 (0.13)
GAGE -0.09 (0.51) -0.07 (0.56) 0.11 (0.28) -0.07 (0.58)
GSEX 6.58*** (0.00) 5.96*** (0.00) 3.31* (0.06) 5.83*** (0.01)
GEDUCATION 0.61*** (0.00) 0.56*** (0.00) 0.74*** (0.00) 0.55*** (0.00)
GFARMSIZE -0.87 (0.32) -0.44 (0.63) -1.16 (0.15) -0.36 (0.67)
GINCOME -5.36e-04*** (0.00) -5.31e-04*** (0.00) -5.22e-04*** (0.00) -5.30e-04*** (0.00)
GHOUSEHOLDSIZE 2.31*** (0.00) 2.19*** (0.00) 2.50*** (0.00) 2.17*** (0.00)
IMR 0.24*** (0.01) 0.22** (0.01) 0.27*** (0.00) 0.22** (0.02)
Observations 216 216 216 216
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sargan test 0.13 0.45 0.15
Notes: Robust p-value in parentheses with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
The P-value of Sargan test is presented for IV estimations in col 2, 3 and 4; The family and year dummies are controlled
in all estimations; BDF refers to the estimator of spatial instrumentation as discussed by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009).
Let’s first check out the results of within and BDF estimations in table 5. In all
these estimations, the social network effect is significant and positive. The magnitude of
coefficient varies from 0.60 to 0.79. Our conclusion of large social multiplier effect is thus
not rejected by the robustness check. Besides, the role of women, education and labor
force favor organic adoption while off-farm activity is the major competitor for organic
farming development. All these results are consistent in the robustness check.
Table 6: Robustness check(II)
Dependant variable: ORGANIC(1/0)
Estimator WITHIN WITHIN-2SLS
GORGANIC -1.55*** (0.00) -2.44*** (0.00)
C*GORGANIC 1.57*** (0.00) 2.43*** (0.00)
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AGE 0.96*** (0.00) 0.99*** (0.00)
FARMSIZE 0.01 (0.12) -1.25e-03 (0.90)
INCOME 1.26e-07 (0.42) 3.63e-07 (0.20)
HOUSEHOLDSIZE -0.01* (0.07) -0.02 (0.20)
GAGE -0.16*** (0.00) -0.10** (0.02)
GSEX -0.23 (0.80) 1.11 (0.52)
GEDUCATION 0.13 (0.32) 0.58** (0.02)
GFARMSIZE 1.14*** (0.00) 0.64 (1.18)
GINCOME -4.33e-04*** (0.00) -2.60e-04* (0.08)
GHOUSEHOLDSIZE -1.31*** (0.00) -2.06*** (0.00)
C*GAGE 0.17*** (0.00) 0.10** (0.02)
C*GSEX 0.04 (0.96) -1.11 (0.51)
C*GEDUCATION -0.15 (0.23) -0.58** (0.02)
C*GFARMSIZE -1.10*** (0.00) -0.70 (0.13)
C*GINCOME 4.59e-04*** (0.00) 2.78e-04* (0.05)
C*GHOUSEHOLDSIZE 1.21*** (0.00) 2.03*** (0.00)





Notes: Robust p-value in parentheses; With ***, ** and * denoting signif-
icance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. The family and year
dummies are controlled for in both estimations. The P-value of Sargan test
is presented for IV estimation.
Next, let’s check out the heterogeneous effect of social network with the difference-in-
difference analysis in table 6. Not surprisingly, GORGANIC becomes negative whereas
the cross term C ∗ GORGANIC is significantly positive. The result indicates that the
probability of organic experts’ adoption is indeed decreasing along with the increasing
number of participants in the social network. This could be due to their strategic be-
haviour given their comprehensive information about the niche market for organic pro-
duce. In contrast, the social network effect is much stronger for new adopters, who have
no comprehensive information about organic farming. Taken together, this result suggests
information spillover as a credible explanation to the large social multiplier effect identi-
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fied in our case. However, the result doesn’t eliminate other mechanisms such as altruism
and social pressure which may also explain the social network effect. More specific data
setting is needed to disentangle these mechanisms and we will leave it for the future study.
7 Conclusion
In order to answer the question of how to achieve sustainable agricultural development,
we investigate an original New Rural Reconstruction example in Sancha village where
basketball game is employed to promote sustainable agricultural innovation, i.e., organic
farming. Our fieldwork and empirical analysis reveal a large social multiplier effect within
the extended social network in the village, which provide robust micro evidence for the
role of social activity in the promotion of sustainable agricultural development.
In developing countries, agricultural development is often constrained by the scarcity
and inefficiency of formal institution in rural areas. The achievement of sustainable agri-
cultural development seems to strongly depend on government’s colossal investment. Al-
ternatively, NRR proposes a cost-effective solution which relies on informal institution–the
social network. Regarded as a major form of social capital, social networks are indeed
widespread in rural areas. Smallholder farmers form social networks on basis of kinship,
friendship as well as social and cultural activities. These social networks are essential for
farmers’ social learning, risk sharing, labor and finance cooperation, thus constitute the
solid social foundation for farmers’ collective action to achieve the sustainable develop-
ment.
For the perspectives, the experience of NRR in China proposes a new angle to rethink
current rural development. Its sustainable development strategy and original social ini-
tiative deserve more profound studies to generate comprehensive understanding of this
alternative development model.
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9 Appendices
9.1 Location of Sancha village
Source: www.map-of-china.org
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9.2 Definition and description of variables
ORGANIC Farmer’s self report of organic farming adoption. It’s a binary variable
code “1” if at least one plot of paddy field is under organic management.
Code “0” otherwise.
BASKET Farmer’s report of basketball game participation. It’s a binary variable
code “1” if household participates in the basketball game more than 3
times per month during the year. Code “0” otherwise.
AGE Age of household head.
SEX Gender of household head. Code “1” for woman, “0” for man.
EDUCATION Education level of household head. Code“0” for illiteracy, “1” for primary
school first grade, “2” for primary school second grade, “3” for primary
school third grade, “4” for primary school fourth grade, “5” for primary
school fifth grade,“6”for primary school sixth grade,“7”for middle school
first grade, “8” for middle school second grade, “9” for middle school third
grade, “10” for high school first grade, “11” for high school second grade,
“12” for high school third grade.
HOUSEHOLDSIZENumber of permanent residents of the household.
FARMSIZE Area of cultivated paddy field during the reference year, the unit is
“Mu”(0.067 ha).
INCOME Off-farm income of off-farm activities, the unit is “Yuan”.
REMOTENESS The distance to the basketball court measured by walk time. Code “1”
for less than 5 minutes, “2” for 5 to 15 minutes, “3” for more than 15
minutes.
KID The number of kids under 5 years old and taken care by the household
head.
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